Intergenerational contracts and the quantity-quality transition
The concern of this article is with the intergenerational transmission of poverty, a particular manifestation of chronic poverty (Hulme et al. 2001) . Chronic poverty is defined by its extended duration. It does not necessarily describe the same phenomenon as extreme poverty but it is highly probable that many chronically poor people are also likely to be extremely poor: the severity and intractability of deprivation are likely to go hand in hand. The transmission of poverty across generations occurs through the transmission of various kinds of deficit. In contexts where poor people rely primarily on the sale of their labour power to meet survival needs, the failure to invest in the 'human capital' of successive generations, their education and skill, is likely to be a common route through which the intergenerational transmission of poverty occurs. While investments in human capital can, in principle, occur at any stage of the individual life course, in practice, investments undertaken during childhood have critical implications for subsequent life chances. In most societies, parents continue to play a critical role in determining the nature of these investments.
The idea of the 'quantity-quality' trade-off in family formation strategies (Becker and Lewis 1973) makes the logical point that, given resources constraints, there is a trade-off between the number of children within a family and investments in their human capital. This tradeoff provides a link between increasing investments in children's education and broader processes of demographic transition and the shift Imagining the Future: Children, Education and Intergenerational
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In an earlier paper (2001), Kabeer sketches out a stylised account of the changing nature of the implicit intergenerational contracts between parents and children in the context of demographic change that might help to explain the 'quantity-quality' transition in family formation strategies. This included an 'affective transition', the greater willingness on the part of parents to invest emotionally in each individual child as initial, largely 'exogenous', declines in mortality increased the likelihood that children would survive beyond the first precarious years of life (Stone 1977; Scheper-Hughes 1992) . A second shift related to the greater sense of personal agency that parents are able to exercise in relation to family formation strategies as more effective means for assuring both child survival and birth control become available to them (Cleland and Wilson 1987) . This has been variously described as part of a larger transition from 'accommodation' to 'intervention' and by Cleland and Wilson (1987) 'from fatalism to a sense of control of destiny'. As Montgomery (1999: 20) points out, this does not necessarily suggest that a sense of agency is absent in highmortality, pre-transitional societies, but rather that the scope for strictly personal agency is much more limited.
A decline in mortality can lead to fertility decline at the very minimum because it reduces the 'insurance motivation' for having children; in other words, having enough children to ensure that a certain number (sometimes of the preferred sex) will survive to adulthood. Other factors which accompany declining mortality may further strengthen the desire for fertility control. Similarly the availability of effective means of birth control can act to hasten the speed of fertility decline through a number of different pathways: changes in the wider society which reduce the 'benefits' or increase the 'costs' of large family size and, some have argued, because it brings the fertility decision within the 'calculus of conscious choice' (Cleland and Wilson 1987) .
As child survival becomes increasingly assured, as parents begin to take an active role in how many children they have rather than leaving it to fate or divine will, a different form of decision-making becomes possible, 'one that involves forwardlooking strategies that play out over longer time horizons' (Montgomery 1999: 12) . A transition in time horizons permits the consideration of new forms of investment in children which might not have previously featured as possible options, even at the level of imagination.
Particularly for those close to the margins of survival, education exemplifies an investment which entails considerable risk. It requires families to sacrifice current consumption in favour of future returns. In an uncertain world, it represents a statement of faith about the future: about what the future will bring, about which children will survive to take advantage of it, and about their willingness to fulfil their obligations to the generation that made the sacrifice. Smaller family sizes make such investments more affordable. The 'quantity-quality' transition has thus been described as transition from family-building by fate to family-building by design (Lloyd and Ivanov 1988) .
There is, as Montgomery points out, nothing automatic or self-propelling about these transitions. It may be one or more generations before declines in mortality give rise to declines in fertility and a further delay before parents become more willing to invest in their children's education. Context matters for the pace of these transitions:
In the most basic sense, some level of development is required before family size can have an impact on child investment. In an environment without schools or clinics, parents have few ways to materially influence their children's health or schooling, whether their resources are spread among many or few. (Lloyd 1994 ; see also Desai 1993) Parents' assessments of potential returns to investments in health or education will partly depend on the quality of health and educational services available and partly on likely opportunities in the labour market (Lloyd 1994: 9) . What appears to be key therefore is the likelihood that the fertility transition will be accompanied, or followed, by rising levels of investment in children's education.
Exploring the quantity-quality transition in Bangladesh
Evidence suggests that a quantity-quality transition is in process in Bangladesh. Declines in child mortality and fertility have occurred in recent decades as part and parcel of larger social and economic change, including the spread of the cash economy, the productivity gains of the Green Revolution, increased ease of communications and transport, the growing importance of the media, and the proliferation of contract-based relationships in place of previous personalised patron-client ones. All of these have directly or indirectly increased the value attached to the acquisition of basic levels of information and knowledge, particularly in the context of engagement with markets and services, and are likely to have contributed to a remarkable rise in children's education, including girls' education, at the national level.
However, the pace of change has not been uniform across the population. It has been slower in poorer districts of Bangladesh and among poorer households. At the same time, it is clear that poverty is not an insurmountable barrier to children's education and that many children from low-income households do go to school (see overview in Kabeer 2003) . The relationship between household poverty and children's education appears to be mediated by a variety of factors, including the child's age and gender, household livelihood strategies, parental education and the availability and quality of schooling. Severity of deprivation may also matter. Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) explorations in rural Bangladesh suggest that the very poor may have different priorities and operate with different understandings of intergenerational contracts from moderately poor households. The very poor described their most pressing needs in terms of three meals a day, adequate housing and basic healthcare, while the moderately poor specified concrete housing, comprehensive health services and education as their priorities (Hamid 1998). The significance attached to education was thus one of the factors which distinguished the poor from the very poor.
If failure to invest in children's education is, indeed, one of the forces driving the intergenerational transmission of poverty, and if poverty itself is one of the factors behind this failure, we need a better understanding of the relationship between household poverty and children's education. The aim of this article is to revisit the idea of intergenerational contracts as a framework for understanding the uneven pace of the quantity-quality transition in the context of urban Bangladesh. The analysis here draws on quantitative data gathered through a household survey carried out in 2001 in two slum neighbourhoods (Pallabi and Agargaon) in Dhaka. The survey covered 616 households, roughly evenly divided between the two neighbourhoods. A sub-component of the survey was addressed to all children aged 5-15 in these households; this covered 297 households. Qualitative data was subsequently gathered through in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with parents, children and teachers.
3 Intergenerational contracts and children's education: findings from urban Bangladesh As a first stage of the research, we explore the evidence for the persistence of intergenerational contracts in our sample population. Table 1 suggests that parents continue to have certain expectations of support from their children. They have high expectations of financial and social support from sons and high expectations of social but not financial support from daughters. The picture in relation to financial expectations reflects the reality of a culture that privileges men, and constrains women, in access to material resources, income and opportunities. We find similar gender asymmetries expressed in relation to ideal education levels for sons and daughters, with higher educational ideals expressed in relation to sons. There is not a great deal of difference in these expressions of expectations from children and obligations towards children by age of parent. However, an examination of percentages of children who had ever been to school by age cohort of the population suggests that there has been a change over time ( Table 2) . Percentages of children ever enrolled are higher and gender disparities have all but disappeared in the younger cohorts, echoing rising education levels and declining gender disparities in the national data (Kabeer 2003) . It is also evident that everenrolled figures overstate the extent of change.
Comparison of estimates in the 5-15 age group suggest that current enrolment rates are much lower than ever-enrolled rates, indicating that dropout rates remain high: while around 70 per cent of children were ever enrolled in school, only 50-60 per cent of children are currently going to school. A further disaggregation of this age group shows that most of these dropouts occur in the 13-15 age group when, presumably, children are old enough to be sent to work or to help out around the house. The table also shows that around 10-20 per cent of children are engaged in waged work. Most of these are from the out-of-school category.
Our findings, therefore, suggest uneven changes in intergenerational contracts. Against a background of rising levels of education in younger age cohorts, our sample is divided into parents who have managed to send and keep their children in school and parents who have either failed to enrol their children at school or failed to keep them there. Interviews with parents in the former category provide some insights into why parents are increasingly redefining their obligations to their children to include investments in their education. There was widespread acknowledgement that education had increased in value over time to the extent that it was now a necessity. As one parent put it:
Is there anything possible today without an education? You need to be educated if you go for a job in any garment factory, if you want to start a business and even if you want to set up a shop. You need education when you walk on the streets of Dhaka city: what is written on this sign says and what is written on that sign. What number stands for what, looking for a house, finding a place.
However, the value of education was interpreted differently for sons and daughters. For sons, it was closely linked to their occupational choices, to getting a job that would command status and money in the world and which might predispose them to looking after their parents in their old age. For daughters, education would prepare them for their role in a society where what was expected of wives and mothers was undergoing a change. In addition, some mothers believed that it would equip their daughters with the ability to stand on their own feet should their marriages break down or their husbands prove unreliable. This kind of reasoning explained why, despite their poverty, many parents had struggled to send and keep their children in school. At the same time, there is a sizeable sample of parents whose children either had never enrolled in school or had dropped out of school. Presumably, this second group of parents either did not subscribe to these changing values about education or else were unable to act on them. In the rest of this article, we examine these two groups in greater detail. We use our quantitative data to ascertain how they differ from each other and our qualitative data to interpret these quantitative differences and to explore in greater detail how they might lead to differences in intergenerational contracts between the two groups. Some of these differences are statistically significant and offer causal insights into the pattern of educational deficits.
Household vulnerability and educational deficits
Within the urban slum contexts where the majority of households were poor, our data suggests that it was vulnerabilities of various kinds that explained differences in children's educational outcomes. As Chambers (1989) points out, the concept of vulnerability encompasses both 'external' and 'internal' dimensions. The external dimension refers to the likelihood of shocks and stresses faced by households, both idiosyncratic to specific households and those that are generalised across households. The internal dimension, on the other hand, refers to the capacity of different households to cope with these threats to their livelihoods and standard of living. Table 3 captures some of the differences in the capacity to cope between households whose children were at school and those where they were not. It suggests that children were less likely to go to school in households which did not own any assets, which relied on causal labour as their primary source of livelihood or which were headed by women.
Our research material suggests that different kinds of vulnerability tend to overlap. Thus, casual labour households were vulnerable, in the first instance, because of the irregularity and unpredictability of their income flows. Their mean income levels were lower than households reliant on other kinds of occupations, and they were less likely to report a surplus at the end of the month. Their members generally earned on a daily basis and did not always know if and how much they would earn on a particular day. What they ate each day depended on what they earned each day. One husband and wife who worked together in a brickfield earned on a literally 'brick-by-brick' basis: they were paid Tk35 for every hundred bricks so that their earnings varied by the number of bricks they managed to break between them and the number of days they managed to find work.
In addition, casual labour households were also vulnerable because they lacked some of the other resources that could help them to cope with the stresses and strains that were a routine part of their lives. Such households owned fewer assets than other households in our sample, were less likely to report a surplus at the end of the month, less likely to have access to formal sources of loans or affiliations with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and less likely to have savings.
Female-headed households were also characterised by overlapping forms of disadvantage. They also had lower levels of assets, were less likely to report a surplus at the end of the month, were less likely to have savings or access to formal sources of loans and were less likely to be affiliated to a formal civil society organisation. However, their economic vulnerability did not necessarily stem from the casual nature of their work: many worked in garment factories or domestic work and were less 14 reliant on casual labour as their main source of income than male-headed households. Instead, their vulnerability was a product of gender-related disadvantage.
Many female household heads were divorced or deserted. Jesmin and Salway (2000) talks about 'serial monogamy' to describe the marital behaviour of men in his study of a Dhaka bastee (slum neighbourhood). The marriage patterns captured by our qualitative research suggested a much greater diversity: some men left their wives and were never seen again, others contracted polygamous marriages, others remarried but then returned for a while, contributed to the marriage or expected their wives to support them and then left again. Thus, female headship was generally an indicator of some form of marital crisis which had left the wife to fend for herself and her children. Such forms of crisis were usually associated with an abrupt drop in household income. Most female household heads were, therefore, primary breadwinners for their households in a society in which gender confined women to a far more limited set of income-earning opportunities than men. Most did not have any adult male members in the household who could have earned, or shared the burden of earning, the household livelihood. Their mean incomes were not only lower than those of male-headed households but also lower than levels reported by other assetless and casual labour households.
Anxiety about the future clearly had an objective basis in reality for the more vulnerable households within slum neighbourhoods, given the variety of threats to which they were exposed and the fragility of their household resource base. In addition, for those who were engaged in a constant struggle to keep their heads above water, there was a strong subjective dimension to their experience of vulnerability which limited their ability to think ahead and plan for the future. This was evident from the response given by Shahjahan, a rickshaw puller who was asked why he did not send his children to the free government school in his locality: Children from these different categories of vulnerable households were less likely to be enrolled in school -and more likely to drop outbecause of the 'hand-to-mouth' existence imposed by low and uncertain earnings of their households and the absence of an asset base to fall back on in times of crisis. If the willingness to invest in a child's education requires the capacity to imagine and plan for the future, as discussed earlier in the article, these parents were largely oriented to the present: they had 'no space in their mind' to think about the future when the present was so crowded with demands. They had to discount any form of expenditure which not only failed to meet their immediate needs, but whose benefits were uncertain in terms of what they might be and whether they might ever materialise. Their explanations as to why they did not send their children to school spelt out the harsh nature of the trade-offs they faced:
I have enough brains to know it is good to send the children to school, but what can I do? Can anyone study on an empty stomach? Will they first eat and survive or will they first go to school and study? My father passed away four years ago. Although I know that it is my duty to provide food for my parents, I was unable to do so. I think that is the reason my father died. I feel I failed him. My other brothers also did not provide any food to our parents. My mother is a beggar now. For a man who cannot even provide his mother with food, tell me, how can he provide school fees for children?
Endemic insecurity and educational deficits
Our survey data helped us to identify particular categories of vulnerable households who had either failed to enrol their children in school or had failed to keep them enrolled in school.
However, our qualitative interviews highlighted other kinds of insecurities, which had similar effects. These could not be reduced to specific threats and events but were woven into the stressful fabric of daily life in urban slum neighbourhoods. They partly reflected the physical constitution of these neighbourhoods. Excluded from the safer and higher valued locations in the city, the poor were concentrated in its more precarious sites: its fragile embankments, garbage dumps and areas through which other people's effluent flowed (Wood and Salway 2000) . This made them vulnerable to seasonal flooding, landslides and the risk of disease.
Insecurities were also generated by the structure of livelihood opportunities in these neighbourhoods. While the urban informal economy is generally characterised by casual waged and self employment in manufacturing, trade and service activities, urban slum neighbourhoods tend to be sites of various 'antisocial livelihood activities', including theft, drugselling, gambling, professional begging and prostitution, which flourish in slum areas, adding a criminal underground element to the informal economy (Khan 2001).
In addition, insecurities inhered in the social relationships prevailing in slum neighbourhoods. 'Mafia-like' gangs of mastaans (musclemen) acted as intermediaries between slum dwellers and local politicians, businessmen and other powerholders. They also played a central role in the underground economy. As Wood and Salway (2000) put it, they operated like entrepreneurs of a certain kind, exploiting the vulnerabilities of the slum dwellers, on the one hand, and the needs of politicians, officials, private sector business and the middle classes for clients, cheap labour, votes and so on, on the other. They controlled access to housing, to livelihood opportunities, to local amenities, including illegal connections to public utilities through their capacity for brokering patronage or using violence, or the threat of violence.
Violence in the slums has also escalated over the past decade because of the increasingly confrontational nature of national politics; strikes, curfews and political conflicts have become commonplace. Boys dropped out to roam the neighbourhood with gangs of other boys like themselves. Female household heads faced particular problems controlling unruly sons: they were more likely to have to go out to work for a living and less likely to have an adult male in the household to impose discipline. One female head had decided that sending her only son away to a madrassah which had residential facilities was the only way to remove him from the influence of the slums. However, male household heads also faced problems maintaining control over sons, particularly if their wives were working. As one father lamented: The importance of values and aspirations as an influence on which children went to school and which did not is evident from Table 4 . It tells us that parents who would like their sons and daughters to achieve graduate-level education are more likely to report children in school than those with lower aspirations. Parents who aspire to salaried jobs for their children are more likely to have children attending school while those who intend to send their children into garment factory jobs are less likely to have children at school. Finally, children who express indifference to education are also less likely to be at school.
Failures of provision: the 'costs' of education
For parents facing unruly children, a priority was to find some way of disciplining them. Both work and school offered the possibility of security as well as a measure of discipline. However, here certain aspects of educational provision in the slums militated against the extent to which schools could serve such a role (Table 5 ). The first related to the perceived quality of education.
Government neglect of the slums had resulted in extremely inadequate forms of provision, in terms of quantity as well as quality. While there was some NGO provision, it was not able to compensate for government failure. As both parents and teachers pointed out, there was more government support for education in rural areas than in urban. Some parents talked about sending their children back to the village for education to take advantage of the food-foreducation scheme and for government stipends. The other frequently cited factor was the perceived cost of education. As Table 5 shows, parents who perceived education to be costly were far less likely to enrol children in school than the rest. The household survey suggested that of households with at least one child currently in school, 58 per cent paid annual tuition fees, 54 per cent paid session fees, 54 per cent paid for books and stationery, 33 per cent paid for exam fees, 17 per cent paid towards the child's tiffin (lunch) and 17 per cent paid for a private tutor. These costs are clearly likely to be a deterrent for parents who earn very little and often irregularly. And while only 17 per cent were paying for a private tutor, private tuition was increasingly seen as a prerequisite for getting on in school and for passing exams. One educational practitioner we interviewed referred to the 'phantom private tuition system' that propped up public educational provision, tuition that was recommended and provided by the very teachers who taught them within the public system. Despite all these problems, there was sufficient enthusiasm for schooling as a 'social good' expressed during focus group discussions to suggest that committed efforts at community mobilisation by government or NGO to overcome some of these obstacles could pay positive dividends.
4 Disrupting the intergenerational transmission of poverty: some policy implications
We suggested at the start of this article that transmission of human capital deficits across generations, exemplified by the failure to invest in children's education, was a major factor driving the intergenerational transmission of poverty. This suggests a degree of path dependence in life trajectories across generations. The children of household heads (but not spouses) who are themselves uneducated are less likely to go to school (Table 6 ). They are less likely to have worldviews that give value to education or to imagine a life for their children very different from the one that they themselves have had.
There are also broader social pressures reinforcing these processes. Children are less likely to go to school when they grow up in communities in which very few children go to school, where the pressure of peers works to discourage school attendance, and where they perceive their own life chances in terms which provide few incentives to go to school.
However, while some degree of path dependence may explain why so many children in the urban slums do not go to school, there is enough evidence from the same slums to suggest that this future was not pre-ordained. We have focused in this article on those parents who failed to send their children to school or failed to keep their children at school. A very different story emerges if we explore the experiences of those parents who managed, despite their poverty, to enrol their children in school and keep them there long enough for them to complete primary and, in some cases, secondary education. There are stories of enormous sacrifices by both parents and children. They testify to the fact that, although the odds are against them, uneducated parents need not necessarily produce uneducated children.
A first set of responses relates to the persistence of educational deficits. A first set of responses relate to ideas and aspirations. It is evident from our findings that parents who aspire to higher education for their children and who imagine a different future for themselves than their own life experiences might have led them to expect are more likely to value education and to ensure that their children go to school. While parents' own education level is one factor in shaping these aspirations, it is not the only factor. Another important factor has been the role of the government. While the government in Bangladesh has largely failed to promote educational opportunities for the urban poor, its campaign to raise public awareness about the value of education appears to have made a difference. Many of the parents we interviewed used the government slogan about illiteracy: 'we have eyes, but we cannot see'. A proactive stance by the government can make a difference because, despite all its failings, the government continues to have a presence and legitimacy in the eyes of the poor that is not matched by other institutions, including NGOs.
A second set of responses relates to the provision of educational services. The greater likelihood that parents with some education are more likely to ensure their children's schooling highlights the importance of educating the current generation of children if the cycle of poverty is to be broken. Simply getting children into schools is only the beginning of the challenge. First-generation learners in a family are known to require a higher level of support and commitment from parents and from teachers. Their parents are not accustomed to the idea that children need to attend school regularly to benefit; that they should not be withdrawn to do household chores or step in for a breadwinner when the household faces a crisis; that they should be encouraged to do homework. In addition, parents are unable to give them the help they may need at home to guide them in their homework. Actively involving parents and teachers to meet this challenge, designing the school curriculum and educational materials to transform school attendance into a joyful rather than alienating experience, holding teachers accountable for ensuring teaching standards within the classroom that do not necessitate additional private tuition, offering life skills which prepare children to participate in the wider society and economy: educational policy will clearly have to be thought about more imaginatively than is currently the case.
Finally, however, there is a need to consider the very real material constraints that lie behind the failure to send and keep children at school. As we have seen, it is the more vulnerable households, those headed by women or primarily reliant on earnings from casual labour, that are less likely than the rest of the population to send their children to school. While there are various NGOs active in our study neighbourhoods, and NGO membership is associated with higher likelihood of children attending school, the more vulnerable households are less likely to belong to an NGO. NGO membership appears to operate through building the asset base of low-income households rather than influencing values and aspirations, suggesting the importance of material pathways of change. Clearly, some form of basic safety net that tides households through periods of crisis could make an enormous difference to their capacity to keep their children at school. Given the significance of health-related expenditures as a major factor in perpetuating and exacerbating poverty, security of access to basic health services might allow parents to aspire to, and afford, education for their children.
Concluding comments
Returning to the idea of continuities and transitions in intergenerational contracts within the family, it is clear from our findings that there are many more influences at work than our very simple framework allowed for. We did not investigate the affective dimension of these contracts but we are able to make a number of points about questions of personal agency and changing time horizons. We suggested people's sense of personal agency increased as far as family formation processes were concerned with the decline in child mortality and the greater availability of family planning. However, it is clear that sense of agency is also shaped by the larger context in which families find themselves and that many of those we interviewed did not feel that they had much control over their lives: this partly reflected the vulnerability of their own households as well as the endemic insecurity of the environment in which they lived. Questions of agency had a close bearing on their ability to think in terms of the future: as one harassed father put it, they did not have the 'space in their minds' to think about their children's current educational options and certainly none to plan for the future.
What was also missing in our analytical framework was any attention to the possibility of children exercising agency in shaping educational outcomes. Yet this was clearly a factor. Children's preferences were likely to be strongly influenced by parents' views but they were also shaped by the views and behaviour of their peers. Children's own interest in education as well as the example set by their peers played an important role in explaining which children stayed in school and which dropped out. Policies to address the intergenerational transmission of poverty through educational deficits will have to factor children's views and values into their design.
Notes
1 An attempted rape at 3 o'clock in the afternoon close to where our interview was taking place brought home how real these fears were. An old man had entered a neighbouring house to rape a 12-year-old girl who had been left on her own while her mother went out to work. The neighbours heard her screaming and came to her rescue. The men of the area paraded the old man through the neighbourhood to shame him. Our respondent said: 'You see, now you understand why we are so afraid for our daughters. But if that man had political connections, could anyone have done anything?'
